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NOTES
LOTTERY LOGISTICS: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF A
STATE LOTTERY ON INDIAN GAMING IN OKLAHOMA
Steve J. Coleman'
I. Introduction
Brad Henry was sworn in as Oklahoma's twenty-sixth Governor on January
13, 2003. His journey to the State Capitol was an unlikely one. After
securing the Democratic nomination with an upset victory in the primary, the
Shawnee Senator utilized his plan for an education lottery to supplement his
early momentum and overcome Republican candidate Steve Largent to win
Oklahoma's gubernatorial election.2
Henry believes that a state-operated education lottery will generate funds
of approximately $300 million to $500 million for the state.3 This money
would be used to improve public schools, raise teacher salaries, and provide
tuition-free scholarships for college students.4 Oklahoma is currently facing
a $677 million revenue shortfall5 and education, perhaps more than any other
area, is feeling the effect as an increasing amount of Oklahoma teachers are
being laid off, class sizes are growing, school supplies are dwindling, school
days are being shortened, and extracurricular activities are being slashed.
Given the situation, it is no surprise that Henry's plan for an education lottery
has received strong support from Oklahomans. 6 A state lottery potentially
benefits many groups of Oklahomans: teachers, students, parents, coaches,
school administrators, staff members, and Indians. That's right, Brad Henry's
plan for an education lottery has the potential to substantially benefit
© 2003 Steve J. Coleman
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1. Carmel Perez Snyder, Henry Sworn in as Governor; Optimism Cornerstone ofMessage,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 14, 2003, at IA.
2. John Greiner, Candidates Take Chance on Lottery, DAILYOKLAHOMAN, Sept. 22, 2002,
at IA.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Paul Conners, Arizona, Tribes Enter Pact, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 5, 2002, at A5.
6. Greiner, supra note 2, at IA. Polls show that 73% of Oklahomans say they want a
lottery if it favors education.
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Oklahoma Indian tribes by providing an avenue to operate casino-style games
on Indian land in Oklahoma. This aspect of the lottery fuels much of the
debate as to whether the State of Oklahoma should embrace this form of
gaming.
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),,which provides a statutory
basis for tribes to operate gaming facilities divides gaming into three
categories.7 Class III gaming includes typical, Vegas-style, casino games such
as blackjack, poker, roulette, and slot machines.8 Parimutuel horse racing and
lotteries represent other forms of Class III gaming.9 In 1983, the State of
Oklahoma amended its gambling laws to legalize parimutuel wagering on
horse racing (parimutuel horse racing).' The Horse Racing Act defines
parimutuel wagering as wagering on the outcome of horse races in which
those who wager purchase tickets on a horse or horses and all the wagers for
each race are pooled and held for distribution to the winners." IGRA
classifies parimutuel horse racing as a Class III game. 2 Accordingly, Class
III gaming, in the form of parimutuel horse racing has existed in Oklahoma for
twenty years. Since the establishment of IGRA, many Oklahoma Indian tribes
have capitalized on Oklahoma's regulatory approach to parimutuel horse
racing by establishing off track betting venues in their casinos. However, no
Oklahoma tribe has successfully endeavored to supplement its gaming
operations with other forms of Class III games by contending that Oklahoma's
regulatory approach toward parimutuel racing creates a duty in the State,
pursuant to IGRA, to negotiate for the operation of other Class III, casino-style
games on Oklahoma Indian lands. The introduction of another Class III game,
a state lottery, is likely to revitalize claims by Oklahoma Indian tribes that the
State has a duty to negotiate for the operation of additional Class III games.
Title 21, section 1051 of the Oklahoma Statutes defines a lottery as any
scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by chance among persons
* who have paid or agreed to pay valuable consideration for the chance to obtain
property. " The essential elements of lottery pursuant to this definition are: 1 )
the potential acquisition of property; 2) based on a chance for which; 3)
valuable consideration is given. The propensity of a state lottery to trigger
7. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(5), 2703 (2000).
8. Id. § 2703(8).
9. Id.; see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir.
1990).
10. Oklahoma Horse Racing Act, 3A OKLA. STAT. § 200 (2001).
l1. Id. § 200.1.
12. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2000); see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029.
13. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1051 (2001).
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discussion concerning a state's permissible Class III gaming activities is well
documented. Oklahoma's definition of a lottery is similar to corresponding
definitions in Texas and New Mexico. In both of these states it has been
argued that gaming activities such as baccarat, blackjack, craps, roulette, and
slot machines are encompassed within the states' broad, permissive definitions
of lottery. The foundation of this argument is that these games, like a lottery,
are games that involve the essential elements of prize, chance, and
consideration and that because the state permits one form of game where these
elements are present, the state no longer evidences a prohibitory policy toward
other games involving the same elements.'4 Definitions and characteristics
however, are not the only aspects of state lotteries that generate discussion
regarding a state's policy toward Class III gaming. Legalization of a
combination of Class III games, specifically of parimutuel horse racing and a
state lottery has been determined in other jurisdictions to evidence a state
policy toward Class III gaming that is regulatory rather than prohibitory, thus
requiring states to negotiate for the operation of other Class III games within
Indian country. 5
A lottery is a unique form of Class III gaming and statutory definitions of
lotteries are subject to broad interpretation. In addition, authorization of
multiple Class III gaming activities may potentially alter a court's perception
of state policy toward Class III gaming. IGRA's scope of gaming provision
provides that: "Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only
if such activities are located in a State that permits such gaming for any
purpose by any person .... ",6 The combination of this language from IGRA
and a decision by the State of Oklahoma to implement a lottery will stimulate
debate as to whether Oklahoma is a state that permits Class III gaming and
may well pave the way for Indian tribes in Oklahoma to force the State to
negotiate compacts authorizing the tribes to operate full-scale, casino-type
gambling on Indian land in Oklahoma.
Does a state lottery open the door to Class III gaming on Indian land in
Oklahoma? The State's most informed individuals disagree. R. Perry Beaver,
principal chief of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, a tribe that contributed to
Brad Henry's campaign, believes that a state lottery may allow his tribe to
14. See Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d I I (N.M. 1995); Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 852
F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
15. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); Lac du
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis.
1991).
16. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
venture in to other Class III arenas.'" Brad Henry disagrees, "I've done the
research on the lottery and based on my research, I'm extremely confident that
a state-sponsored lottery will not open up full-scale Class III gaming in
Oklahoma to the Indian tribes."" Neal Leader, Assistant Attorney General
thinks that the rights of Oklahoma tribes may be slightly increased. He
believes that IGRA is "game- specific" meaning that if a state implements a
lottery, then lotteries, and not other Class III games, become a proper subject
of state-tribal compacts. 19
Who is right? The answer to this complex. dilemma rests with the
interpretation of the IGRA scope of gaming provision: "Class III gaming
activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are located in
a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person . .. " More
specifically the result hinges on the interpretation of the words "such gaming."
What does "such gaming" mean? How broadly should a court construe these
two words?
This note analyzes the substantial impact of the words "such gaming" on
the scope of permissible gaming within Indian Country. Part II begins with
a breakdown of California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,2 the
foundation of Federal Indian gaming law. Part III follows with an outline of
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The combination of Cabazon and IGRA
set the stage for courts in each circuit to evaluate IGRA's scope of gaming
provision as it relates to the range of permissible gaming within Indian
Country. Part IV encompasses an examination of the principal cases within
each circuit that have thoroughly scrutinized IGRA's scope of gaming
provision. Part V involves a review of noted Federal Indian law expert Judge
William C. Canby's interpretations of several key scope of gaming issues.
The note concludes with a discussion of the potential impact a state-
sanctioned lottery may have on the State of Oklahoma and the Indian tribes
within its borders.
11. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
Modem Indian gaming originated in the 1970s with Indian tribes in Florida
and California. Tribes in these states operated bingo halls and other
17. Randy Ellis, Governor-Elect Says 'No'to Vegas-Style Gambling, DAILY OKLAOMAN,
Nov. 24, 2002, at IA.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(B) (2000).
21. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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commercial gaming activities that were not in accordance with state laws and
regulations.22 Both Florida and California believed that state gaming
regulations applied equally to Indian tribes. California's efforts to prohibit
tribal games, or at least impose state gaming laws on Indian tribes within
Indian Country, prompted the case of California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians.2
3
California was, and still is, a Public Law 280 state, meaning that its
criminal laws apply to Indians in Indian country but that its regulatory and
legislative authority do not. The central issue before the Supreme Court was
whether California's law prohibiting gaming activities, unless operated by
charitable organizations, was criminal-prohibitory or civil-regulatory.24 If
California intended to prohibit certain conduct, then Public Law 280
controlled the conduct and the Indians were precluded from operating the
challenged gaming activities. However, if the state permitted the challenged
conduct, but subject to state regulation, then the law was civil regulatory and
California law was not applicable in Indian country.25 The Court concluded
that California regulated rather than prohibited gambling activities and as a
result Indian tribal gaming activity was subject to tribal and not state
jurisdiction.26 This decision reflected the principle that tribes are sovereign
entities and that federal law limits the applicability of state and local law to
tribal Indians within Indian Country.27
The Court reasoned that because California authorized parimutuel horse
racing, permitted many organizations to conduct bingo and card games, and
even encouraged its citizens to participate in casino-style gambling via a state
lottery, the state's public policy did not prohibit gambling.28 Additionally, the
Court rationalized its decision by citing the government's strong interest in
encouraging tribal economic development29 and explaining that gaming
offered a substantial source of revenue for the tribes.
Cabazon's impact on Indian Gaming was substantial. This case provided
a broad, categorical basis for distinguishing between criminal-prohibitory and
civil-regulatory state laws as they relate to Indian gaming. The Cabazon
22. Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, I WYO. L. REv. 427, 427
(2001).
23. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
24. Id. at 205-07.
25. Id. at 209.
26. Id. at210-11.
27. Id. at 207.
28. Id. at 210-11.
29. Id. at 216, 218-19.
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decision established that in a state where gaming is not criminally prohibited,
tribes are not subject to state regulation and interference concerning the
challenged gaming.30 States that do not prohibit all forms of Class III gaming
are powerless to curtail gaming in Indian country, but Congress is not.
The United States serves a guardian role in relation to the Indian tribes."'
This role creates in Congress a duty to act in the tribes' best interest and also
vests in the government a plenary power over the Indian tribes.32 Congress
utilized this power to create the Indian Gaming Regulation Act (IGRA) of
1988, which served as "a legislative limitation to the [inherent] tribal power
recognized in ...Cabazon." 3 IGRA was Congress's attempt to strike a
balance between the rights of tribes as sovereigns and the interests of many
states in regulating and limiting sophisticated forms of gambling within their
boundaries. 4
II. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act - IGRA
Congress identified three reasons for the implementation of IGRA. The
first and primary goal is to provide a statutory basis for Indian tribes to
conduct gaming activities as a means of encouraging tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.3" The second
goal is ensuring that tribes receive the benefits from their gaming activities
and thus provides methods for regulating tribal gaming activities that are
geared toward protecting these activities from organized crime.36 The third
goal is creation of a federal body to oversee and protect Indian gaming.
Congress did this in the form of the National Indian Gaming Commission.37
Congress divided gaming into three categories: Class I, Class II, and Class
III. Class I games are defined as traditional games commonly associated with
tribal ceremonies and played for prizes of minimum value." Class I games are
solely under the control of the Indian tribes.39
30. Washburn, supra note 22, at 428.
31. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
32. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977).
33. Washburn, supra note 22, at 428.
34. S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5-6, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075-76.
35. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000).
36. Id. § 2702(2).
37. Id. §§ 2704-2708.
38. Id. § 2703(6).
39. Id. § 2710(a)(1).
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Class II games include bingo and alternate forms of the game as well as
pull-tabs, lotto, tip jars, and punch cards with the requirement that these games
be played in the same location as bingo.4" Card games may also be included
in Class II games if the state approves of the card games or if statutes are
silent regarding the card games and such games are played elsewhere in the
state.4 Class II gaming is within the control of the tribes but is subject to
some restrictions within the Act. IGRA embraces the Cabazon holding in that
there is the opportunity for Class II gaming subject to the requirement that the
state "permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or
entity."42 The circuits are divided as to whether Cabazon's broad
interpretation applies equally to Class III games. Another significant
distinction between Class II and Class III gaming under IGRA is that if a tribe
seeks to operate a Class II game and the state regulates Class II games, the
tribe may operate the game. Whereas a tribe seeking to operate a Class III
game in a state that regulates such games must also secure a gaming compact
with the state.43
Class III is defined as, "all forms of gaming that are not Class I gaming or
Class II gaming. 44 Class III encompasses most traditional casino games such
as slot machines, craps, roulette, poker, blackjack, parimutuel horse racing,
and lotteries. Most state policy issues with gaming concern Class III games.
As a result, Congress established two requirements that tribes must meet in
order to conduct Class III gaming within Indian Country. First, as with Class
II gaming, tribes must satisfy IGRA's scope of gaming provision and are only
permitted to conduct Class III gaming in states that allow this category of
gaming.4' This requirement is the source of the "such gaming" debate
discussed herein. Upon establishing that a state permits Class III gaming, a
tribe must then secure a compact with the state to operate the proposed Class
III activity.46
Originally, the tribal-state compact requirement afforded tribes significant
leverage. As enacted, IGRA required that in situations where tribes
established that a state regulated and did not prohibit Class III gaming, states
had a duty to negotiate a compact with the tribe.47 States that ignored a tribe's
40. Id. § 2703 (7)(A).
41. Id. § 2703(7)(ii).
42. Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).
43. Id. § 2710(d).
44. Id. § 2703(8).
45. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
46. Id. § 2710(d).
47. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(a).
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request to enter into a gaming compact or failed to negotiate in good faith
exposed themselves to federal court action by the tribe." The tribes' superior
leverage positions in Class III compact negotiations under IGRA was short
lived.
The 1996 case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida49 resulted in the
nullification of a tribe's right to sue a state for failing to negotiate in good
faith. The Court held that despite the clear intent of Congress to abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity, Congress lacked the power to do so." This
decision did not invalidate any part of IGRA, but its affect on the tribes is
considerable. Tribes maintain a right to engage in Class III gaming, but to do
so they must negotiate with the state. After Seminole, a state has no incentive
to negotiate with the tribes and thus can effectively block Class III Indian
gaming within its borders." The holding in Seminole greatly undermines a
fundamental principle of IGRA, but tribes may still have a remedy. IGRA
suggests that the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to prescribe a
gaming compact that is consistent with the proposed compact to allow tribes
to conduct Class III gaming on Indian land. 2 The post-Seminole problems
now faced by tribes regarding the compacting process are indeed challenging,
but recall that under IGRA reaching a tribal-state compact is the second hurdle
a tribe must clear before operating Class III games in a state. The first hurdle,
establishing that a state permits Class III gaming, has itself proven to be an
extremely complex process.
Like Chief Beaver and Governor Henry, tribes and states frequently
disagree over the scope of gaming allowed under IGRA. Again, the source of
this common area of controversy is IGRA's scope of gaming provision that
reads: "Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such
activities are located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by
any person . . . ." Tribes argue that the holding of Cabazon and its
criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory distinction is fully incorporated into
IGRA, and as a result IGRA requires a state that allows any Class Ill gaming
activities to negotiate with a tribe as to any form of gaming that fits within the
Class III category. States, on the other hand, focus on the word permits and
argue that IGRA restricted the Cabazon holding, thus limiting a state's
48. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i).
49. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
50. Id. at 72-73.
51. Washburn, supra note 22, at 430.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (2000).
53. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
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negotiation duties to particular Class III games that the state allows others to
operate.
The potential lottery in Oklahoma can be used as an example to clarify the
traditional positions of tribes and states. If the State of Oklahoma implements
a lottery, Oklahoma Indian tribes that wish to engage in gaming activities such
as blackjack, poker, roulette, and slot machines will argue that the State,
through its implementation of a lottery and regulation of parimutuel horse
racing, has evidenced a regulatory rather than prohibitive policy towards the
operation of Class III games, and because the State permits the operation of
Class III games it has a duty to negotiate with a tribe concerning any gaming
activity within the Class III category. This is an example of the "category
perspective." Many tribes believe that if a state allows any form of Class III
gaming, the tribe may conduct "such gaming," which refers to any gambling
activity properly categorized as Class III and the state has a duty to negotiate
for the proposed game.
States interpret IGRA's scope of gaming provision much more narrowly
and argue that IGRA granted states a means to control the forms of Class III
gaming within their borders. This is an example of the "game-specific
perspective." If Oklahoma implements a state lottery then the "such gaming"
language of IGRA should be read to mean that Oklahoma permits lotteries, a
type of Class III gaming, and that as a result the State has a duty to negotiate
with tribes seeking to conduct lotteries but not with tribes seeking to conduct
alternate forms of Class III gaming in Oklahoma. Cases addressing this exact
issue and requiring an interpretation of IGRA's such gaming language have
reached the appellate level in four circuits. The Second and Seventh Circuits
embraced the category perspective and resolved the issue in favor of the
Indians. The Eighth and Ninth circuits adopted the game-specific perspective
to support the position of the states.
IV Principal Scope of Gaming Decisions
A. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit was the first court to interpret IGRA's scope of gaming
provision following the enactment of IGRA. At issue in MashantucketPequot
Tribe v. Connecticut54 was a Connecticut statute that permitted nonprofit
organizations to conduct "Las Vegas Nights" during which the organizations
offered games of chance such as blackjack, poker, and roulette for the purpose
54. 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990).
No. 2]
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of supplementing fund-raising efforts.55 Pursuant to IGRA, the Mashantucket
Pequots (Pequots) sought an order requiring the State of Connecticut to
negotiate a compact that would enable the tribe to operate the same Class III
games authorized by the Connecticut statute.56
Connecticut argued that its limited authorization of these gaming activities
by nonprofit organizations did not amount to a general allowance of "such
[casino-type] gaming" as required by IGRA's scope of gaming provision and
also that the proposed gaming was "contrary to the State's public policy.""
The Pequots argued that Cabazon's criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory test
was incorporated into IGRA's scope of gaming provision as it relates to Class
III games, and that because Connecticut allowed the category of games at
issue, the games were a proper subject for tribal-state compact negotiation."
The Second Circuit held that the correct test for interpreting IGRA's scope
of gaming provision was Cabazon's criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory
test.59 In reaching this decision, the court first looked to the legislative history
of IGRA. The Senate Report committee specifically adopted the Cabazon test
as the proper mechanism for interpreting the language of IGRA § 2710(b)(1)
covering Class II games. Although Connecticut argued that the language of
§ 2710(d)(1), covering Class II games, and that of § 2710(d)(1), covering
Class III games, indicated a congressional intent that the sections be
interpreted differently, the court reasoned that the legislative history
interpreting § 2710(b)(1), the Class II scope of gaming provision, was
instructive as to the proper meaning of the language in § 2710(d)(1 ), the Class
III scope of gaming provision.6 ' The court stated that:
It is a settled principle of statutory construction that when the same
word or phrase is used in the same section of an act more than
once, and the meaning is clear as used in one place, it will be
construed to have the same meaning in the next place.6'
The court also reasoned that the state's approach 62 disregarded the heart of
55. Id. at 1026 n.5.
56. Id. at 1025.
57. Id. at 1029.
58. Id. at 1030.
59. Id. at 1031.
60. Id. at 1030.
61. Id. (citing United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1978)).
62. Regarding this approach the court said:
Under the states approach, . . . even where a state does not prohibit Class III
gaming as a matter of criminal law and public policy, an Indian tribe could
[Vol. 27
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the legislative compromise regarding Class III gaming- to serve the interests
of both the states and the tribes63 and would render the compacting process
that "Congress established as the centerpiece of the IGRA's regulation of
Class III gaming... a dead letter."64
Applying the Cabazon test, the court concluded that Connecticut must
negotiate with the Peqouts regarding the tribe's operation of casino-type
games because the state authorized Class III games and thus this category of
gaming did not violate Connecticut's public policy.65 The court's application
of the Cabazon test resulted in a broad interpretation of IGRA's scope of
gaming provision, the "category perspective." This approach produces a
greater likelihood that the gaming activity will become the subject of a
compact because a permissive position toward any form of Class III gaming
renders a state's laws regulatory rather than prohibitory." The Seventh
Circuit reached a similar result the following year.
B. The Seventh Circuit
As in the Second Circuit in Mashantucket Pequot, the central question
before the court in Lac du Flambeau Band ofLake Superior Chippewa Indians
v. Wisconsin concerned the correct interpretation of IGRA's scope of gaming
provision.67 This case involved a dispute as to whether Wisconsin was
required to include casino games, video games, and slot machines in its tribal-
state compact negations with the Lac du Flambeau and Sakaogon tribes.68
Wisconsin conducted a state-operated lottery and authorized parimutuel
wagering.69 The state was in the process of drafting final tribal-state compacts
with the tribes when questions surfaced concerning the permissible scope of
gaming under IGRA and specifically whether the tribes should be permitted
to operate gambling activities such as blackjack, roulette, and slot machines
nonetheless conduct such gaming only in accordance with, and by acceptance of,
the entire state corpus of laws and regulations governing such gaming.
Id. at 1030-31.
63. Id. at 1030.
64. Id. at 1031.
65. Id.
66. William E. Horowitz, Note, Scope of Gaming Under the Indian Gaming RegulatoryAct
of 1988 After Rumsey v. Wilson: White Buffalo or Brown Cow, 14 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J.
153, 178 (1996).
67. 770 F. Supp 480, 484 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
68. Id. at 482.
69. Id. at 483.
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in the state when these activities were "not conducted by anyone else in
Wisconsin. 7°
In Lac du Flambeau, the State contended that casino games, video games,
and slot machines were not permitted for any purpose by any person and
formulated this claim around the word "permits." Wisconsin argued that
"permits" meant "formally or expressly granting leave." Given this definition,
a Class III activity was not the proper subject of a tribal-state compact unless
the State expressly authorized the playing of a particular type of game.7'
In rejecting Wisconsin's position, the court first identified multiple
alternate definitions of the word "permits." Second, the court asserted that
Wisconsin's interpretation of IGRA's "such gaming" provision ignored the
Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon, "the [very] case on which Congress
relied in drafting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act."' 7 The court clearly
embraced Cabazon's criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory test and offered a
simple, concise test for determining a state's policy when interpreting IGRA's
scope of gaming provision:
If the policy is to prohibit all forms of gambling by anyone, then
the policy is characterized as criminal/prohibitory and the state's
criminal laws apply to tribal gaming activities. On the other hand,
if the state allows some forms of gambling, even subject to
extensive regulation, its policy is deemed to be civil/ regulatory
and it is barred from enforcing its gambling laws on the
reservation.73
The court likened the case to Cabazon. Just as California evidenced a
regulatory policy through parimutuel racing and state lotteries, the court found
that Wisconsin voters, in passing an amendment to their state constitution
permitting a state lottery, had facilitated a "state policy ...that is now
regulatory rather than prohibitory in nature. 74
The State then advanced a "game-specific" interpretation of IGRA's scope
of gaming provision and argued that Wisconsin law must give express
authorization for a "gaming activity" before it becomes the proper subject of
a compact negotiation.75 The court noted that Wisconsin's interpretation
70. Id.
71. Id. at 484-85.
72. Id. at 485.
73. Id.
74. Id at 486.
75. Id. at 487.
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would defeat the congressional intent of providing a mechanism for tribal-
state negotiations because it would allow states to unilaterally impose their
gaming regulatory schemes on tribes.76 The court held that because Wisconsin
had a regulatory policy toward Class III gaming, the State was obligated to
negotiate with the tribes concerning any activity that includes the elements of
prize, chance, and consideration and that is not prohibited expressly by state
law."
The Seventh Circuit clearly and convincingly rejected Wisconsin's attempt
to promote a game-specific interpretation that called for a narrow reading of
IGRA's scope of gaming provision. Like the Second Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit supported the application of Cabazon's expansive
criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory test when determining the legality of
Class III gaming within a state. Because the Senate report that accompanied
the passage of IGRA expressly stated that the Cabazon test should apply to
Class II gaming and IGRA's Class II and Class III gaming provisions
contained identical language, these courts reasoned that the Senate Report
established the applicability of the Cabazon test to Class III games. This
expansive interpretation was challenged by the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota.78
C. The Eighth Circuit
Two years later in Cheyenne River, IGRA's scope of gaming provision was
at the heart of the controversy.79 The Eighth Circuit's holding was simple,
straightforward, and in direct opposition to the previous interpretations of
IGRA's scope of gaming provision proffered by the Second and Seventh
Circuits. In Cheyenne River, the court held that the "such gaming" language
of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B), referred to herein as IGRA's scope of gaming
provision, did not require a state to negotiate tribal-state compacts with
respect to forms of games it did not permit."0
Beginning in 1989, South Dakota permitted state lotteries, video lottery,
limited card games, slot machines, parimutuel horse and dog racing, and
simulcasting. 8' This fact did not persuade the court in its adoption of a very
narrow, game-specific perspective ofIGRA's scope of gaming provision. One
76. Id.
77. Id. at 488.
78. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 279.
81. Id. at 276.
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of the video games permitted by the state was video keno. The Cheyenne
River Sioux tribe contended that because the state allowed a form of keno, the
tribe should be able to offer traditional keno on its lands.8 2 In denying the
tribe's request, the court reasoned that traditional keno and video keno were
different games, that video keno was the only form of keno permitted by South
Dakota, and that it would be unfair to other tribes to allow the Cheyenne River
Sioux to operate traditional keno on their lands.8 3
D. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals commands respect regarding Federal
Indian law issues and specifically Indian gaming issues. It is the source of the
seminal Cabazon decision and is home to some of the most respected minds
in Federal Indian law, notably Senior Judge William C. Canby, Jr., one of the
nation's leading Indian law scholars84 and the author of the American Indian
Law Nutshell."
In Rumsey Indian Rancheria v. Wilson, 6 the Ninth Circuit supported the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Cheyenne River. The Rumsey court held, by a
narrow five to four margin, that California was not required to negotiate
compacts allowing particular games pursuant to IGRA unless identical games
were authorized by state law stating:
IGRA does not require a state to negotiate over one form of Class
III gaming activity simply because it has legalized another, albeit
similar form of gaming.... In other words, a state need only allow
Indian tribes to operate games that others can operate, but need not
give tribes what others cannot have.87
The controversy in Rumsey was triggered when the State of California
refused to negotiate with several tribes a compact that would permit the
operation of certain electronic gaming devices as well as live banking and
percentage card games.8 The tribes sought an interpretation by the court that
would apply Cabazon's broad test to IGRA's scope of gaming provision as it
relates to Class III games. 9 California contended that IGRA itself did not
82. Id. at 278.
83. Id.
84. Horowitz, supra note 66, at 184-85.
85. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 1998).
86. 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994).
87. Id. at 1258.
88. Id. at 1255.
89. Id. at 1257.
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require the State to negotiate and argued that a state that did not permit the
gamingactivities had no duty to negotiate the activities with the tribe.9" As
the State of Wisconsin had unsuccessfully attempted to do in Lac du
Flambeau, California claimed the meaning of "permit" was unambiguous and
that state law clearly prohibited and did not permit the operation of banked
card games or slot machines.9
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit first rejected the tribes' proposed
broad interpretation of IGRA in favor of implementing ajudicial standard that
utilized "its traditional tools of statutory construction." '92 Next the court noted
that IGRA's scope of gaming provision, § 2710(d)(1)(b), was unambiguous
and cited a previous case that clearly defined the term "permit."93 Although
the court stated that California had no duty to negotiate because the term
"permit" was unambiguous, the court proceeded to explain its interpretation
of IGRA's legislative history. The most notable portion of the court's review
of IGRA's legislative history focused on the report's silence as to Cabazon's
applicability to Class III games. The court concluded that Congress's failure
to mention Class III gaming, combined with the established principle that
identical words in the same act may be construed differently, supported its
position that IGRA's Class II and Class III scope of gaming provisions were
to be read differently, applying the Cabazon test only to Class II gaming.94
The Ninth Circuit's game-specific interpretation of IGRA's scope of
gaming provision effectively rejected the theory of the Second and Seventh
Circuits that IGRA, as applied to Class III gaming, retains the
criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory distinction set forth in Cabazon." Judge
Canby dissented from the opinion in Rumsey. His dissent raises several
pertinent issues that would undoubtedly resurface if IGRA's scope of gaming
provision is subsequently called into question in the Tenth Circuit as a result
of Oklahoma's implementation of a state lottery. Before analyzing Judge
Canby's concerns, three Tenth Circuit cases that could prove influential when
addressing scope of gaming questions that may arise as a result of Oklahoma's
implementation of a state lottery are briefly reviewed.
90. Id. at 1256.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1257.
93. Id. (citing United States v. Luander, 743 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984)).
94. Id. at 1258-59.
95. Washburn, supra note 22, at 443.
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E. The Tenth Circuit
The scope of gaming issue has not clearly surfaced in the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. One Tenth Circuit case, United Keetoowah Band of
Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma96 touches slightly on the issue. While the
primary impact of Keetoowah Band was its holding that IGRA pre-empted the
application of state law within Indian Country through the Assimilative
Crimes Act,97 the court referenced Senate Report 446, which identified
Oklahoma as a state that permitted some form of bingo.9" The court stated that
Oklahoma law was civil/regulatory in regard to bingo, this assertion however,
stemmed from the case of Indian Country US.A. v. Oklahoma99 and
consequently did not involve an interpretation of IGRA's scope of gaming
provision as it applies to Class III gaming in Oklahoma.
The New Mexico Supreme Court case of Clark v. Johnson0 offers insight
into how some courts within the Tenth Circuit are likely to interpret IGRA's
scope of gaming provision. In this case the primary issue was whether New
Mexico's Governor exceeded his gubernatorial power by entering into tribal-
state gaming compacts and revenue sharing agreements allowing multiple
tribes to conduct numerous Class III gaming activities that New Mexico state
law did not expressly permit.' In entering into the compacts, the Governor
reasoned that the State's broad authorization of several forms of Class III
gaming allowed for inclusion of all Class III games in the challenged
compacts. 2 The court held that the Governor had exceeded his authority in
entering the compacts." 3 More relevant to this discussion, was the court's
indication that the charitable lottery exception to state gambling laws did not
authorize or "permit" any and all forms of "casino-style" gaming for purposes
of IGRA's scope of gaming provision. 4 Although the court did not decide
which Class III games could properly be catalogued under the lottery
definition, it did cite both Cheyenne River and Rumsey indicating that it would
96. 927 F.2d 1170 (10th Cir. 1991).
97. Id. at 1181.
98. S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5-6, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075-76.
99. 829 F.2d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 1987).
100. 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995).
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id. at 17.
103. Id. at 27.
104. Id. at 20-2 1.
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interpret IGRA's scope of gaming provision in a manner consistent with the
narrow, game-specific perspective of the Eighth and Ninth circuits." 5
Recent decisions within the Tenth Circuit further indicate that its courts
favor a game-specific analysis when interpreting IGRA's scope of gaming
provision. Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming,'06 decided in February of
2002, represented the first time the Tenth Circuit or for that matter, a district
court in the Tenth Circuit, had thoroughly analyzed or interpreted IGRA's
scope of gaming provision." 7 In Northern Arapaho Tribe, the tribe sought to
enter into a compact with the State allowing the tribe to operate an extensive
range of Class III gaming activities including: calcutta, poker, roulette,
parimutuel racing, keno, lottery, slot machines, blackjack, video poker, video
keno, video blackjack, and video horse racing. Wyoming adopted a game-
specific approach contending that, pursuant to IGRA's scope of gaming
provision, it was only required to negotiate games permitted by state law.0 8
After conducting a circuit by circuit review of the principal "scope of
gaming" cases, the court concluded that the expansive, category approach
embraced by the Seventh Circuit in Lac du Flambeau was not applicable
because it was more expansive than the criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory
approach employed by the Supreme Court in Cabazon and by other courts in
cases interpreting IGRA's scope of gaming provision. The court instead
employed a game-specific approach that necessitated a review of each game
to determine if the particular game was consistent with Wyoming public
policy.0 9
The court divided the requested gaming activities into three types of
gaming: 1) calcutta and parimutuel wagering; 2) gaming machines; and 3)
casino-style gambling. The court stated that if Wyoming permitted any of
these types of gaming for any purpose, the State must enter negotiations with
the tribe regarding that game." 0 Wyoming specifically permitted calcutta and
parimutuel wagering and thus was required to negotiate with the tribe
regarding these Class III activities. Wyoming expressly prohibited gaming
machines and consequently was not required to negotiate with the tribe
105. Id.
106. No. 00-CV-221-J, 2002 WL 31961497 (D. Wyo. Feb. 6,2002).
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id. at 9.
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regarding the operation of any Class III activities that utilized gaming
machines such as video poker and blackjack." I
The most interesting portion ofthe decision concerned casino-style gaming.
The court found that despite the fact that Wyoming expressly permitted social
casino-style gambling, it does not follow that it permits Class III gaming. The
court based its reasoning on the fact that Wyoming law codifies an activity
that most states implicitly permit and concluded that because Wyoming did
not permit casino-style gaming for "any purpose," the State was not required
to negotiate such gaming with the tribe."'
The holding of the District Court of Wyoming in Northern Arapaho Tribe
was intended to support a game-specific approach to IGRA's scope of gaming
provision. However, this decision is difficult to reconcile with the game
specific interpretations of courts in other circuits. While the court in Northern
Arapaho Tribe recognized that Wyoming specifically permitted its citizens to
engage in Class III gaming activities, it nevertheless managed to proffer a
ruling that in effect found that the State did not permit such gaming for any
purpose by any person. This holding is inconsistent with the game-specific
holdings of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. It represents an unprecedented,
restrictive approach to the operation of Class III gaming under IGRA and
therefore is likely subject to considerable scrutiny.
These Tenth Circuit decisions are important for a number of reasons. First,
they demonstrate the inexperience of Tenth Circuit courts in evaluating
IGRA's scope of gaming provision as it relates to the operation of Class III
gaming by Indian tribes within the region. Only one court within the Tenth
Circuit has extensively evaluated IGRA's scope of gaming provision and that
court reached an unprecedented result. Second, the cases hint that courts
within the circuit would interpret IGRA's scope of gaming provision in a
different manner. United Keetoowah Band mentions that Oklahoma law is
civil/regulatory, suggesting the implementation of Cabazon's broad
interpretation. In contrast, the language of Clark and the recent result in
Northern Arapaho Tribe suggests that Tenth Circuit courts are inclined to
adopt the restrictive, game-specific interpretations of the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits. The absence of multiple comprehensive evaluations, combined with
the indication of conflicting views, warrants a return to Judge Canby's dissent
in Rumsey, as well as further discussion of several key issues, to gain a better
understanding of the crucial elements that would likely be relevant to a
IlI. Id.
112. Id.
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subsequent interpretation of IGRA's scope of gaming provision by a Tenth
Circuit court.
V The Canby Perspective
Judge Canby authored the dissent to the five to four split decision in
Rumsey. He indicated a strong disagreement with the Ninth Circuit's narrow
interpretation of IGRA's scope of gaming provision and identified several
questionable findings by the court that more than likely will remain central
issues of debate in scope of gaming interpretations by other courts:
This is a case of major significance in the administration of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") and it has been decided
incorrectly, in a manner that conflicts with the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the same statutory provision. The result is to
frustrate the scheme of state-tribal negotiation that Congress
established in IGRA. We should have granted rehearing en-banc
to prevent the near-nullification of IGRA in a circuit that
encompasses a great portion of the nation's Indian country. Our
failure to do so may close the only route open to many tribes to
escape a century of poverty.
The Second Circuit's fears of turning IGRA's compact process
into a dead letter are well founded. The issue here is not whether
California must allow every game the tribes want to conduct; it is
merely whether California has a duty to negotiate with the tribes to
determine what games should be conducted, on what scale, and
who has jurisdiction to enforce gaming laws.
States like California that have no such wholesale public policy
against Class III gaming must, under IGRA, reach an
accommodation between their interests and the strong interests of
the tribes in conducting such gaming ... but under Rumsey, this
whole process is nipped in the bud if the tribe seeks to operate
games that state law. . . prohibit[s].
The Rumsey opinion regards the key question as being whether
the words "permits" is ambiguous; it holds that the word is not
ambiguous, so the State need not bargain. But the proper question
is not what Congress meant by "permits,".. . but what Congress
meant by "such gaming." The structure of IGRA makes clear that
Congress was dealing categorically, and that a state's duty to
bargain is not to be determined game-by-game. The time to argue
over particular games is during the negotiation process.
No. 2]
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The only natural reading of section 2710(d)(1)(B) is that, when
Congress says 'Class III gaming activities shall be lawful ... if
located in a state that permits such gaming . . . ' then "such
gaming" refers back to the category of "Class III gaming," which
is the next prior use of the word "gaming." Rumsey interprets the
statutory language as if it said: 'A Class III game shall be
lawful... if located in a State that permits that game." The plain
language [of IGRA] cuts directly against.Rumsey; Congress allows
a tribe to conduct Class III gaming activities (pursuant to a
compact) if the state allows Class III gaming by anyone." 3
Besides demonstrating strong support for the Second and Seventh Circuit's
broad interpretation of IGRA's scope of gaming provisions, Judge Canby
addressed several key issues that, upon a subsequent evaluation of IGRA's
scope of gaming provision, could and arguably should be decided in favor of
the tribes.
In interpreting IGRA's scope of gaming provision, the Rumsey court
focused on the word "permits" instead of the words "such gaming."".4 As
evidenced by the Seventh Circuit decision in Lac du Flambeau, the word
"permits" is susceptible to classification as an ambiguous term. The words
"such gaming" are clearly ambiguous as they form the foundation of the scope
of gaming debate. Despite the announcement by the court in Rumsey that "in
interpreting IGRA, we use our traditional tools of statutory construction,""' 5
traditional tools of construction are generally not the proper standard when
ambiguous federal language affects Indians. Instead, ambiguous expressions
must be resolved in favor of the Indians." 6 Resolution of IGRA's ambiguous
terms in favor of the Indians would result in application of Cabazon's broad
category perspective to the scope of gaming issue and thereby expand the
scope of permissible gaming activities within Indian Country.
Not only is the word "permits" an arguably ambiguous term, but as Canby
illustrates, the proper question most likely involves Congress's intent as to the
words "such gaming." Moreover, Canby's evaluation of IGRA's scope of
gaming provision is consistent with the foremost grammatical authorities.
Grammatical structure requires that adjectival descriptives that are reflective
by nature refer back to a noun." 7 In this case the noun, "Class III gaming
113. Rumsey Indian Rancheria v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1252-54 (9th Cir. 1994).
114. Id. at 1257.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
117. JoHN C. HODGES & MARY E. WH=FFEN. HARBRACE COLLEGE HANDBOOK 553 (1982).
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activities" is stated in the independent clause of this complex sentence and is
the only mention of gaming activities. It is the subject of the sentence, and
nowhere else in the sentence can there be found any other noun/subject that
deals with the central idea or main thought of the sentence. In other words,
the category of Class III gaming activities is what the "such gaming" language
is referencing.
VI. The Oklahoma Impact
The task of identifying and evaluating the status of the law in various
federal circuits as it relates to IGRA's scope of gaming provision is a
confusing and complex process. This exercise pales in comparison to
predicting how an Oklahoma court would interpret IGRA's scope of gaming
provision in deciding whether to adopt the game-specific perspective that "the
purpose of IGRA was to create a level playing field, granting tribes no more
gaming rights than are permitted by the states in which their reservations are
located,"'  or whether to adopt the "category perspective" that IGRA was
meant "to protect the sovereign right of tribes to create their own laws thereby
effectively allowing them to conduct a wider scope of gaming than permitted
on surrounding state land."" 9 It is apparent however, that regardless of how
Oklahoma interprets IGRA's scope of gaming provision, a decision by the
State of Oklahoma to implement a lottery would create a duty in the State to
negotiate compacts with Oklahoma tribes wishing to conduct their own
lotteries.
There is no guarantee that a state lottery in Oklahoma will translate to an
Indian lottery or lotteries within the state. Oklahoma would have a duty to
negotiate in good faith with the tribes regarding a tribe-sponsored lottery, on
what scale it would be conducted, and which sovereign, the tribe or state,
would have jurisdiction to enforce the associated gaming laws. 2' Although
a few Oklahoma tribes have considered developing their own lotteries should
the state approve such gaming, factors such as: funding, immature tribal
infrastructures, market size, and revenue sharing indicate that the reality of an
Indian-operated lottery is unlikely. A decent lottery is a function of
population. California, New York, Arizona, New Mexico, and Montana are
all states that operate state lotteries, retain significant Indian populations, and
allow some level of Indian gaming, yet none of these states has an Indian-
118. Horowitz, supra note 66, at 199.
119. Id.
120. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(2000).
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operated lottery.' 2' One possibility could be for Oklahoma tribes to pool
funding and create a joint tribal lottery. This form of lottery however, raises
concerns regarding allocation of revenue and intertribal coordination. Further,
the idea of competing against the state and/or multiple Indian tribes in a
heavily segmented market is not likely to appeal to many tribes. ,
22
From a gaming perspective, there are two other major concerns with a state-
sanctioned lottery: 1) the Oklahoma lottery would be threatened by Indian
operated lotteries that are able to offer larger prizes because they are not
burdened by education payouts and state taxes; and 2) as a result of the lottery,
the State will be forced to negotiate with tribes for an increased amount of
Class I11, casino-style, gaming activities. Although these results are
improbable due to strictly allocated tribal funding and the more recent
interpretations of IGRA's scope of gaming provision respectively, they remain
as possible outcomes.' These outcomes, which form the foundation of
opposition to a state-sanctioned lottery, nevertheless could prove to be
powerful tools in the State's effort to cure its $677 million revenue deficit.
Pursuant to IGRA § 271 0(d)(7), if Oklahoma is deemed a state that permits
Class III gaming, the State has a duty to negotiate compacts with the tribes
regarding some form of Class III gaming.'24 Because tribes must have a
compact to operate the Class III games, there exists a strong incentive for
tribal flexibility in the negotiation process. The State of Arizona recently
capitalized on this position by incorporating revenue sharing provisions into
its tribal-state compacts requiring tribes to return 8% of their gaming revenues
to the state.'25 Oklahoma could utilize the Arizona revenue sharing model to
level the lottery playing field. If an Oklahoma tribe requests a compact that
allows the operation of a tribal lottery, the State is in a position to employ a
revenue sharing clause to offset any tribal financial advantages in lottery
operation and simultaneously supplement the State's lottery income that is
earmarked for education.
The Arizona compacting model would also be valuable if a state lottery
were to trigger a broad interpretation of IGRA's scope of gaming provision in
Oklahoma. The State of Oklahoma would be in a position to negotiate tribal-
state compacts that are mutually beneficial to Oklahoma tribes and the State.
12 1. Bob Doucette, Lottery Talk Spurs Interest for 2 Tribes, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 29,
2002, at IA.
122. Id.
123. Rumsey Indian Rancheria v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1251 (9th Cir. 1994).
124. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(2000).
125. Conners, supra note 5.
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The tribal-state compacts would benefit: 1) tribes by allowing them to operate
an expanded number of Class III gaming activities, thereby in6reasing gaming
revenues; and 2) the State of Oklahoma through the utilization of favorable
revenue sharing clauses in each compact to designate gaming proceeds for the
benefit of Oklahoma education.
Indian gaming in the United States is a $12 billion a year industry.'26 While
the gaming industry in Oklahoma represents a small portion of the national
market, it is one of the state's fastest growing market segments. 7 The tribal-
state compact process represents an opportunity for the State of Oklahoma
because it provides a means for the State to benefit from the growth of Indian
gaming in Oklahoma. Moreover, the tribal-state compacting process allows
the State to control its own destiny in terms of revenue production.
Negotiation ofan increased number of tribal-state compacts could allow tribes
to operate more Class III gaming activities. The operation of additional Class
III gaming activities improves tribal revenues and in doing so increases the
State's share of the gaming proceeds. In addition to allowing the State to
control the size of its "piece of the pie," tribes are benefitted in the form of
increased employment, improved education and health care, and decreased
member reliance on welfare. 2s
Currently, Oklahoma tribes operate fifty-five gaming facilities throughout
the state.'29 Although technology allows the tribes to operate games that
remarkably resemble Class III, casino-style games, these games are subject to
prize limits and other Class II specifications and therefore are not subject to
tribal-state compacts. Despite the inherent revenue limitations of Class II
gaming, the Indian gaming industry in Oklahoma has and will continue to
grow. Because Class II games are not subject to the compacting process, the
State cannot benefit from the operation of these activities. Continuation of the
tribal-state standoff regarding the operation of Class III games restricts the
fiscal development of Oklahoma tribes and eliminates any opportunity the
State has to extract revenue from one of its most rapidly developing markets.
The purpose here is not to propose that a wholesale policy toward Class III
gaming is the resolution to Oklahoma's revenue shortfall, but rather to
126. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, Tribal Gaming Revenues, at http://www.nigc.gov/
nigc/nigcControl?option=TRIBALREVENUE (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
127. Liz Gray, Oklahoma and Gaming: Is Class III on the Horizon?, NATIVE AMERICAN
TamES.COM. 14 (2002), at http://www.okit.com/gaming/2002/octnov/oklahomagaming.html.
128. Joe Laxague, Note, Indian Gaming and Tribal-State Negotiations: Who ShouldDecide
the Issue of Bad Faith?, 25 J. LEGIS. 77, 93 (1999).
129. Gray, supra note 127, 16.
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demonstrate one mechanism through which a broad interpretation of IGRA's
scope of gaming provision, if prompted by a state-sanctioned lottery, could be
beneficial to both a state hungry for a funding boost and Indian tribes seeking
to enter the next phase of a tribal economic revolution.
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